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This paper describes an experiment designed to investigate the impact of aligning student, parent,
and teacher incentives on student achievement. On outcomes for which incentives were provided,
there were large treatment effects. Students in treatment schools mastered more than one standard
deviation more math objectives than control students, and their parents attended almost twice as many
parent-teacher conferences. In contrast, on related outcomes that were not incentivized (e.g. standardized
test scores, parental engagement), we observe both positive and negative effects. We argue that these
facts are consistent with a moral hazard model with multiple tasks, though other explanations are possible.
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Incentives are a ubiquitous part of economic life. From manufacturing to nance, the salaries
of a signicant portion of American workers are driven by explicit performance incentives
through mechanisms like commissions, performance bonuses, or piece-rate contracting (Wia-
trowski 2009). Using data from a large autoglass rm, Lazear (2000) demonstrates that pure
incentive eects can increase worker productivity by over 20 percent. Paarsch and Shearer
(2000) estimate that incentive eects from paying piece-rate wages to Canadian tree planters
increases the quantity of trees planted by 22.6 percent. Analyzing the organizational struc-
ture of hedge funds, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) reveal that stronger incentives for
asset managers within hedge funds are correlated with better fund performance in both the
short and long term. Murphy (1998) shows that executive compensation is more strongly
tied to rm performance (in the form of bonuses and options) among rms with above me-
dian sales in the S&P 500 than those with below median sales. In a meta-analysis of 45
studies on the eects of incentives on individual behavior, Condly, Clark, and Stolovich
(2003) estimate that incentives improve individual performance on a range of tasks by an
average of 22 percent.
Whether incentives can be used in the education sector to increase student achievement
is less clear. Providing nancial incentives for getting better test scores or grades yields little
to no eects on student achievement (Angrist and Lavy 2000, Bettinger 2010, Fryer 2011).
Rewarding students to read books or for other desirable behaviors can yield moderate eects
(Fryer 2010, Fryer 2011a). Teacher incentives in developing countries have shown promise,
but the evidence from experiments in the US suggest that teacher incentives are ineective
at increasing student achievement (Fryer forthcoming, Springer et al. 2010, Duo et al.
forthcoming, Glewwe et al. 2010, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011). Taken together,
the evidence to date suggests that the impact of nancial incentives on student achievement
2is small and generally statistically insignicant, but these incentives programs may have a
positive return on investment due to their relatively low costs.
One potential explanation for the ecacy of incentives in the workplace (and the lack
thereof in education) is that rms recognize that the prot function has important comple-
mentarities and design incentive schemes that exploit that fact. In the rm Lazear (2000)
analyzes, the incentive scheme is introduced by executives whose prots grow if workers per-
form more eciently. In turn, they oer to share some of this gain in exchange for increased
productivity. The eect of this aligned incentive scheme on employee behavior is striking,
as productivity increases by over 44 percent, about half of which Lazear attributes to pure
incentive eects. Similarly, in the hedge funds that Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) study,
asset managers not only collect a fee from the performance of the fund but are themselves
invested, so that managers', fund owners', and individual investors' interests are aligned by
common incentives.
Despite a wide range of theoretical and empirical analysis suggesting that the educa-
tional production function exhibits crucial complementarities (Lazear 2001, Hanushek 2007,
Krueger 1999, Smiley and Dweck 1994, Todd and Wolpin 2003, Wagner and Phillips 1992),
experiments to date have not take this into account. This was the impetus for our experi-
ment.
Theoretically, the eects of aligning incentives are ambiguous. If the education produc-
tion function has important complementarities or students/parents/teachers lack sucient
motivation, dramatically discount the future, or lack accurate information about the returns
to schooling, providing incentives may yield increases in student performance. If, however,
students lack the structural resources to convert eort into measurable achievement (e.g. en-
gaging curriculum), then aligning incentives might have little impact. Finally, if incentives
change the equilibrium allocation of eort for students, parents, or teachers across tasks in
a way that undermines student achievement, aligning incentives could lead to negative out-
3comes (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Moreover, as some argue, nancial rewards (or any
type of external incentive) may crowd out intrinsic motivation.1 Which one of the above ef-
fects { complementarities in production, investment incentives, structural inequalities, moral
hazard, or intrinsic motivation { will dominate is unknown. The experimental estimates ob-
tained will measure the combined eects of these elements and other potential channels of
inuence.
In the 2010-2011 school year, we conducted an experiment to better align incentives of
students, parents, and teachers in fty low performing schools in Houston, Texas (twenty-
ve treatment schools, twenty-ve control schools).2 Students received $2 per math objective
mastered in Accelerated Math (AM), a software program that provides practice and assess-
ment of leveled math objectives to complement a primary math curriculum. Students prac-
tice AM objectives independently or with assistance on paper worksheets that are scored
electronically and verify mastery by taking a computerized test independently at school.
Parents also received $2 for each objective their child mastered and $20 per parent-teacher
conference attended to discuss their student's math performance. Teachers earned $6 for
each parent-teacher conference held and up to $10,100 in performance bonuses for student
achievement on standardized tests.3;4 We distributed $51,358 to 46 teachers, $430,986 to
1,821 parents, and $393,038 to 1,734 students across the 25 treatment schools.5
The results from aligning student, teacher, and parent incentives are interesting and, in
1There is an active debate in psychology as to whether extrinsic rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation.
See, for instance, Deci (1972, 1975), Kohn (1993, 1996), Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Cameron and Pierce
(1994), for diering views on the subject.
2Throughout the text, I depart from custom by using the terms \we," \our," and so on. While this is a
sole-authored work, it took a team of people to implement the experiment. Using \I" seems disingenuous.
3Both treatment and control teachers were eligible for performance bonuses through Houston's ASPIRE
program.
4This incentive scheme does not even scratch the surface of what is possible. We urge the reader to
interpret any results as specic to this incentive scheme and refrain from drawing more general conclusions.
5In some cases, multiple parents were able to split rewards from a single student, however only one parent
was paid in any given pay period and the net amount paid to any family unit remained the same whether
or not multiple parents received payment.
4many cases, surprising. Throughout the text we report Intent-to-Treat (ITT) estimates. On
direct outcomes { those for which we provided incentives { there were large and statistically
signicant treatment eects.6 Students in treatment schools mastered 1.087 (.031) standard
deviations (hereafter ) or approximately 125 percent more math objectives than control stu-
dents. On average, treatment parents attended 1.578 (.099) more conferences with teachers,
almost twice as many as their control group counterparts.
In addition, we analyzed students' price sensitivity by estimating the change in the num-
ber of math objectives mastered before and after two unexpected price changes. The ex-
periment began in October and was scheduled to end the last week of May. At $2 per
objective, the average number of objectives mastered per week was 2.05. In mid-February,
we announced an increase in the reward for an objective mastered in AM from $2 to $4 for
the next four four weeks. During these four weeks, the mastery rate rose to 3.52 objectives
per week. Similarly, the rst week of May, we announced that the price would increase from
$2 to $6 for one week, and students mastered an average of 5.80 objectives during that week.
Comparing the students' behavior at dierent price levels yields a price elasticity of demand
for math objectives of 0.87, suggesting that the demand for math objectives is nearly unit
elastic in the range of prices we tested.
In stark contrast, the impact of our incentive scheme on related behaviors for which we
did not provide incentives is mixed. Students in treatment schools are 5.6 percentage points
more likely to report that their parents check their homework more than in the previous
year and 11.2 percentage points more likely to report they prefer math to reading. Similarly,
treatment parents were 12.2 percentage points more likely to report that they ask about math
homework more often than reading homework. Math achievement on state standardized
tests increased 0.081 (0.025), though reading achievement decreased by a nearly identical
6We also estimate treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) eects using a two stage least squares (2SLS) strategy
with lottery selection as an instrument for participation. See Appendix Table 1 for rst-stage and 2SLS
regressions. The results remain qualititatively identical to our ITT specication.
5amount. The impact on Stanford 10 scores { a nationally-normed assessment of grade level
course material { are statistically zero for math and negative for reading. There were no
statistically signicant eects on measures of eort or intrinsic motivation.
We conclude our statistical analysis by estimating treatment eects across a variety
of pre-determined subsamples: gender, race, free lunch eligibility (an income proxy), and
previous year test score. The treatment eect on objectives mastered is statistically larger
for girls than for boys, though boys show larger eects on both TAKS and Stanford 10 tests
(only the dierence in Stanford 10 eects are statistically signicant). The most striking
and robust dierences occur when we stratify on previous year test scores. On nearly every
dimension, high achieving students gain from the experiment whether you compare them to
high achieving students in control schools or low achieving students in treatment schools.
For instance, high achieveing students master 1.7 more objectives, have parents who attend
two more parent-teacher conferences, have 0.23 higher standardized math test scores and
equal reading scores relative to their control counterparts. In most cases, these dierences
are statistically distinguishable from the eects obtained by low achieving students.
We argue that our set of facts is consistent with the classic moral hazard model with
multiple tasks developed in Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991), though other models and explana-
tions are possible.7 If students allocate eort across a series of tasks in order to \produce"
academic achievement, the eect of subsidizing one input on a student's investment in other
activities is ambiguous. Intuitively, one might expect some crowding out of other inputs, but
the precise changes in equilibrium quantities { and therefore achievement { will depend on
the degrees of complementarity between the tasks. Consistent with this model, our subgroup
7An alternative { though not mutually exclusive { explanation for the latter is misalignment between the
AM program and the Texas state test. Less than 70 percent of the 152 individual AM 5th grade objectives
align with any Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS) 5th grade math standard, and the vast majority
of those lessons that are aligned correspond to a small subset of TEKS 5th grade math standards. If we
restrict our analysis to three sections of the TAKS math test that encompass 87 percent of the aligned AM
objectives, the treatment eect is 0.137 (.028). The treatment eect on the remaining sections of the test
is 0.026 (.030).
6analysis reveals that high achieving students exhibit less moral hazard { potentially due to
the fact that they have lower cost of eort or substitution across tasks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of the experimental
literature on the eects of nancial incentives on student achievement. Section 3 provides
some details of our experiment and its implementation. Section 4 describes our data, research
design, and econometric framework. Section 5 presents estimates of the impact of aligned
incentives on direct and indirect outcomes. The nal section concludes with a speculative
discussion of what might explain our new set of facts. There are two online appendices.
Online Appendix A is an implementation supplement that provides details on the timing
of our experimental roll-out and critical milestones reached. Online Appendix B is a data
appendix that provides details on how we construct our covariates and our samples from the
school district administrative les used in our analysis.
2 A Brief Literature Review on Incentives for Student
Achievement
There is a nascent but growing body of scholarship on the role of incentives in education
around the globe.8 In what follows, we partition the literature into incentive programs used
in primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools. For the sake of brevity, we limit our
discussion to experimental analyses.
A. Experiments Using Incentives in Primary Schools
Bettinger (2010) examines a pay-for-performance program for students in grades three
through six in Coshocton, Ohio, a poor and disadvantaged community in Appalachia. Stu-
8See, for instance, Angrist et al., 2002; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton, 2009;
Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2005; Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer, 2006; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos,
2006; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2008; Bettinger, 2010; Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron, 1994
7dents took achievement tests in ve dierent subjects: math, reading, writing, science, and
social studies. Eligible students received $15 for each test on which they scored procient
or better. Students received $20 for scoring \Advanced" or \Accelerated." Bettinger (2010)
reports a 0:13 increase in math scores and no signicant eects on reading, writing, social
science, or science. Pooling subjects produces an insignicant eect.
Fryer (2011a) examines the eect of dierent incentive structures on elementary students
in Dallas and New York, two large urban school districts where the majority of students are
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. In Dallas, students were provided input incentives;
second grade students were paid $2 to read a book and pass a short test to conrm they
had read and understood it. ITT estimates are insignicant in the full Dallas sample, but
subgroup analysis reveals a strong positive treatment eect of 0.173 (0.069) on reading
comprehension among students who took the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills
(TAKS) test, however students who took the Logramos test lag 0.118 behind their control
group peers.
In New York City, fourth grade students were provided incentives on a series of ten stan-
dardized tests. For each test, participating students earned $5 to $25 per exam, depending
upon performance. ITT estimates yield treatment eects of -0.026 (.034) and 0.062 (.047)
on reading and math standardized test scores, respectively.
B. Experiments Using Incentives in Secondary Schools
Domestically, Fryer (2011a) investigates the eect of rewarding Chicago high school stu-
dents for their grades in ve core subject areas { up to $50 per subject in each grading period.
If a student failed a core course she temporarily \lost" all other monies earned from other
courses in the grading period until she recovered the credit or improved the grade. Students
earned half of the cash rewards up front and half were deferred until high school graduation.
ITT estimates suggest small positive eects on direct outcomes in terms of credits earned
8and grade point average - Fryer (2011a) nds treatment eects of 0.093 (0.057) in GPA
and an increase of 1.979 (1.169) credits earned.9 However, ITT estimates yield no eects on
state test scores in reading or math as a result of the program.
Internationally, Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009) conduct a randomized evaluation
of a merit scholarship program in Kenya for girls. Sixth grade girls in program schools who
scored in the top fteen percent in the district on district-wide exams in ve subjects received
an award over the next two years: each year, a winner would receive a grant of $6.40 to cover
school fees, paid to the winner's school; a grant of $12.80 for school supplies, paid to the
winner's family; and public recognition at a school awards assembly. Kremer, Miguel, and
Thornton (2009) nd that the program raised test scores by 0.19 for girls and 0.08 for
boys, although boys were ineligible for any rewards.
In December 2000, the Israeli Ministry of Education selected 40 schools with low Bagrut
passage rates to participate in an incentives program called the Achievement Awards pro-
gram. Bagrut is a high school matriculation certicate. Angrist and Lavy (2009) evaluate
results for high school seniors, who were oered approximately $1,500 to earn their Bagrut
certication. The results are positive but insignicant in the full sample. When the sample
is divided by gender, however, they nd signicantly positive eects on Bagrut receipt rates
among girls.
C. Experiments Using Incentives in Post-Secondary Schools
Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) present results from an evaluation of a program
called the Student Achievement and Retention (STAR) Demonstration Project at a large
Canadian university. Students who were below the top quartile in their incoming high
school GPAs were randomly assigned to one of three treatment arms or to a control group.
In the rst treatment arm, students were oered access to a peer-advising service as well as
9The typical year-long course in Chicago public high schools is worth 4 credits, so the treatment eect
is equivalent to treatment students passing almost one additional semester of a class per year.
9supplemental instruction via facilitated study groups. In the second treatment arm, students
were oered fellowships of up to $5,000 cash (equivalent to a year's tuition) for maintaining
at least a B average, and $1,000 for maintaining at least a C+ average. To be eligible for
the fellowship, students had to take at least 4 courses per term and register for the second
year.10 In the third treatment arm, students were eligible for both the study services and the
fellowship. Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) report that students in the services-only
and fellowship-only treatment arms did not earn higher GPAs and were not more likely to
be retained than students in the control group. The combined services/fellowship treatment
arm had positive eects on Fall semester GPA, but the results were only sustained by female
participants.
Oosterbeek et al. (2010) examine the impacts of a randomized experiment on rst-year
students at the University of Amsterdam. Students were randomly assigned to one of three
groups: a large reward group that could earn a bonus of 681 Euros by completing all the
rst-year requirements by the start of the next academic year; a small reward group that
could earn 227 Euros for completing these requirements; and a control group that could not
earn an award. They nd that the large reward has a small and insignicant positive eect.
3 Program Details
Houston Independent School District (HISD) is the seventh largest school district in the
nation with 202,773 students. Eighty-eight percent of HISD students are black or Hispanic.
Roughly 80 percent of all students are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch and roughly
30 percent of students have limited English prociency.
Table 1 provides a bird's-eye view of our demonstration project. To launch the experi-
ment, we rst garnered support from the district superintendent. Following the superinten-
10The regular course load is 5 courses per term.
10dent's approval, a letter was sent to seventy-one elementary school principals who had the
lowest math performance in the school district in the previous year. We proceeded to meet
with principals to discuss the details of the programs. After principals were given information
about the experiment, there was a 5 day period for schools to opt into the randomization.
Schools that signed up to participate serve as the basis for our matched-pair randomization.
All randomization was done at the school level. After treatment and control schools were
chosen, treatment schools were alerted that they would participate in the incentive program.
Control schools were informed that they were not chosen, but they would still received the
Accelerated Math software { just not the incentives. HISD decided that students and parents
at selected schools would be automatically enrolled in the program. Parents could choose
not to participate and return a signed opt-out form at any point during the school year.
HISD also decided that students and parents were required to participate jointly: students
could not participate without their parents and vice versa. Students and parents received
their rst payments on October 20, 2010 and their last payment on June 1, 2011; teachers
received payments with their regular paychecks.
Students begin the program year by taking an initial diagnostic assessment to measure
mastery of math concepts, after which AM creates customized practice assignments that
focus specically on areas of weakness. Teachers assign these customized practice sheets,
and students are then able to print the assignments and take them home to work on (with or
without their parents). Each assignment has six questions, and students must answer at least
ve questions correctly to receive credit. After students scan their completed assignments
into AM, the assignments are graded electronically. Teachers then administer an AM test
that serves as the basis for potential rewards; students are given credit for ocial mastery by
answering at least four out of ve questions correctly. Students earned $2 for every objective
mastered in this way. Students who mastered 200 objectives were declared \Math Stars"
and received a $100 completion bonus with a special certicate.
11To understand students' price elasticity, rewards were unexpectedly increased twice dur-
ing the program: during the sixth pay period (mid-February to mid-March) students received
$4 for every objective mastered, and during the nal week of the eighth pay period (the rst
week of May), students received $6 for every objective mastered.
Parents of children at treatment schools earned up to $160 for attending eight parent-
teacher review sessions ($20/each) in which teachers presented student progress using Ac-
celerated Math Progress Monitoring dashboards. Parents and teachers were both required
to sign the student progress dashboards and submit them to their school's Math Stars coor-
dinator in order to receive credit. Additionally, parents earned $2 for their child's mastery
of each AM curriculum objective, so long as they attended at least one conference with
their child's teacher. This requirement also applied retroactively: if a parent rst attended
a conference during the nal pay period, the parent would receive a lump sum of $2 for each
objective mastered by their child to date. Parents were not instructed on how to help their
children complete math worksheets.
Fifth grade math teachers at treatment schools received $6 for each academic conference
held with a parent in addition to being eligible for monetary bonuses through the HISD
ASPIRE program, which rewards teachers and principals for improved student achievement.
Each treatment school also appointed a Math Stars coordinator responsible for collecting
parent/teacher conference verication forms as well as printing and distributing student
reward certicates, among other duties. Each coordinator received a stipend of $500, but
this amount was not tied to performance.11
Over the length of the program the average student received $226.67 with a total of
$393,038 distributed to students. The average parent received $236.68 with a total of
$430,986 distributed to parents. The average teacher received $1,116.48 with a total of
11Principals at treatment and control schools were also eligible for monetary bonuses through the HISD
ASPIRE program.
12$51,358 distributed to teachers. Incentives payments totalled $875,382.
Table 2 describes dierences between schools that signed up to participate and other
elementary schools in HISD with at least one fth grade class across a set of covariates.
Experimental schools have a higher concentration of minority students and teachers with
low-value added on math scores. All other covariates are statistically similar.
4 Data, Research Design, and Econometric Model
A. Data
We collected both administrative and survey data from treatment and control schools. The
administrative data includes rst and last name, birth date, address, race, gender, free lunch
eligibility, behavioral incidents, attendance, matriculation with course grades, special educa-
tion status, limited English prociency (LEP) status, and four measures of student achieve-
ment: TAKS and Stanford 10 assessments in Math and ELA. We use adminstrative data
from 2009-10 (pre-treatment) to construct baseline controls and 2010-11 (post-treatment)
for outcome measures.
Our main outcome variables are the direct outcomes that we provided incentives for:
mastering math objectives via Accelerated Math and attending parent-teacher conferences.
We also examine indirect outcomes that were not directly incentivized, including TAKS math
and ELA scale scores, Stanford 10 math and ELA scale scores, and several survey outcomes.
We use a parsimonious set of controls to aid in precision and to correct for any potential
imbalance between treatment and control. The most important controls are reading and
math achievement test scores from the previous year and their squares, which we include in
all regressions. Previous years' test scores are available for most students who were in the
district in previous years (see Table 3 for exact percentages of experimental group students
13with valid test scores from previous years). We also include an indicator variable that takes
on the value of one if a student is missing a test score from a previous year and zero otherwise.
Other individual-level controls include a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
set of race dummies pulled from each school district's administrative les, indicators for
free lunch eligibility, special education status, and whether a student demonstrates limited
English prociency.12 Special education and LEP status are determined by HISD Special
Education Services and the HISD Language Prociency Assessment Committee.
We also construct three school-level control variables: percent of student body that
is black, percent Hispanic, and percent free lunch eligible. For school-level variables, we
construct demographic variables for every 5th grade student in the district enrollment le
in the experimental year and then take the mean value of these variables for each school.
We assign each student who was present in an experimental school before October 1 to
the rst school they are registered with in the Accelerated Math database. Outside the
experimental group, we assign each student to the rst school they attend according to the
HISD attendance les, since we are unable to determine exactly when they begin attending
school in HISD. We construct the school-level variables based on these school assignments.
To supplement each district's administrative data, we administered a survey to all parents
and students in treatment and control schools. The data from the student survey includes
information about time use, spending habits, parental involvement, attitudes toward learn-
ing, perceptions about the value of education, eort and behavior in school, and Ryan's
(1982) Intrinsic Motivation Inventory. The parent survey includes basic demographics such
as parental education and family structure as well as questions about time use, parental
12A student is income-eligible for free lunch if her family income is below 130 percent of the federal poverty
guidelines, or categorically eligible if (1) the student's household receives assistance under the Food Stamp
Program, the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR), or the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families Program (TANF); (2) the student was enrolled in Head Start on the basis of meeting
that program's low-income criteria; (3) the student is homeless; (4) the student is a migrant child; or (5)
the student is a runaway child receiving assistance from a program under the Runaway and Homeless Youth
Act and is identied by the local educational liaison.
14involvement, and expectations.
Survey administration in Houston went relatively smoothly. Incentives were oered at the
teacher level for percentages of student and parent surveys completed. Teachers in treatment
and control schools were eligible to receive rewards according to the number of students they
taught: teachers with between 1-20 students could earn $250, while teachers with 100 or more
students could earn $500 (with fty dollar gradations in between). Teachers only received
their rewards if at least ninety percent of the student surveys and at least seventy-ve percent
of parent surveys were completed.
In all, 93.4 percent of student surveys and 82.8 percent of parent surveys were returned in
treatment schools; 83.4 percent of student surveys and 63.3 percent of parents surveys were
returned in control schools. These response rates are relatively high compared to response
rates in similar survey administrations in urban environments (Parks et al. 2003, Guite et
al. 2006, Fryer 2010).
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of all HISD 5th grade students as well as those in our
experimental group, subdivided into treatment and control. The rst column provides the
mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for each variable used in our analysis
for all HISD 5th grade students. The second column provides the mean, standard deviation,
and number of observations for the same set of variables for our set of treatment schools.
The third column provides identical data for our set of control schools. The fourth column
displays the p-values from a t-test of whether treatment and control means are statistically
equivalent. See Online Appendix B for details on how each variable was constructed.
Within the experimental group, treatment and control students are fairly balanced, al-
though treatment schools have more black students and fewer white, Asian, LEP, and gifted
and talented students. Treatment schools also have lower previous year scores in TAKS
math. A joint signicance test yields a p-value of 0.295, suggesting that the randomization
is collectively balanced along the observable dimensions we consider.
15To complement Tables 2 and 3, Appendix Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of
treatment and control schools, as well as census tract poverty rates. These maps conrm
that our treatment and control schools are similarly distributed across space and are more
likely to be in higher poverty areas of a city.
B. Research Design
There is an active debate on which randomization procedures have the best properties.
Imbens (2011) summarizes a series of (often contradictory) claims made in the literature
and shows that both stratied randomization and matched-pairs can increase power in small
samples. Simulation evidence presented in Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) supports these nd-
ings, though for large samples there is little gain from dierent methods of randomization
over a pure single draw. Imai et al. (2009) derive properties of matched-pair cluster ran-
domization estimators and demonstrate large eciency gains relative to pure simple cluster
randomization.
We use a matched-pair randomization procedure similar to those recommended by Imai
et al. (2009) and Greevy et al. (2004) to partition the set of interested schools into treatment
and control. Recall that we invited seventy-one schools to sign up for the randomization.
Fifty-nine schools chose to sign up. To conserve costs, we eliminated the nine schools with
the largest enrollment among the 59 eligible schools that were interested in participating,
leaving 50 schools from which to construct 25 matched pairs.
To increase the likelihood that our control and treatment groups were balanced on a
variable that was correlated with our outcomes of interest, we used past standardized test
scores to construct our matched pairs. First, we ordered the full set of 50 schools by the sum
of their mean reading and math test scores in the previous year. Then we designated every
two schools from this ordered list as a \matched pair" and randomly drew one member of
the matched pair into the treatment group and one into the control group.
16C. Econometric model
To estimate the causal impact of providing student, teacher, and parent incentives on
outcomes, we estimate Intent-To-Treat (ITT) eects, i.e., dierences between treatment and
control group means. Let Zs be an indicator for assignment to treatment, let Xi be a vector of
baseline covariates measured at the individual level, and let Xs denote school-level variables;
Xi and Xs comprise our parsimonious set of controls. Moreover, let m denote a mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive set of matched pair indicators. The ITT eect, , is
estimated from the equation below:
achievementi;m =  + Xi + Xs + Zs + m + "i;m (1)
The ITT is an average of the causal eects for students in schools that were randomly
selected for treatment at the beginning of the year and students in schools that signed up for
treatment but were not chosen. In other words, ITT provides an estimate of the impact of
being oered a chance to participate in the experiment. All student mobility between schools
after random assignment is ignored. We only include students who were in treatment and
control schools as of October 1 in the year of treatment.13 In HISD, school began August
23, 2010; the rst student payments were distributed October 20, 2010.
5 Results
5.1 Direct Outcomes
Table 4 presents ITT estimates of treatment eects on incentivized outcomes { AM objectives
and parent-teacher conferences. Objectives mastered are measured in  units. Results
13This is due to a limitation of the attendance data les provided by HISD. Accelerated Math registration
data conrms students who were present in experimental schools from the beginning of treatment. Using
rst school attended from the HISD attendance les or October 1 school does not alter the results.
17with and without our parsimonious set of controls are presented in columns (1) and (2),
respectively. In all cases, we include matched pair xed eects. Standard errors are in
parenthesis below each estimate. For simplicity, we focus the discussion in the text on the
regressions which include our parsimonious set of controls. All qualitative results are the
same in the regressions without controls.
The impact of aligning student, parent, and teacher incentives is statistically signicant
across all of the direct outcomes we explore. The ITT estimate of the eect of incentives on
objectives mastered in AM is 1.062 (.202). Treatment parents attended 1.568 (.099) more
parent conferences. Put dierently, our aligned incentive scheme caused an 125% increase
in the number of AM objectives mastered and an 87% increase in the number of parent-
teacher conferences attended in treatment versus control schools. These results stand in
stark contrast to those of Fryer (2010), who nds that monetary rewards for attendance and
behavior exert much smaller and statistically insignicant eects on directly incentivized
behaviors { suggesting that aligning incentives may be important.
In addition, we were able to calculate the price elasticity of demand for math objectives
by examining the change in AM objectives mastered before and after two unexpected price
shocks as seen in Figure 1. After ve months of rewarding math objective mastery at a rate of
$2 per objective, we (without prompt or advance warning) raised the reward for an objective
mastered in AM to $4 for four weeks starting in mid-February and then from $2 to $6 for
one week at the beginning of May. Students responded by increasing their productivity;
the rate of objective mastery increased from 2.05 objectives per week at the price of $2 per
objective up to 3.52 objectives per week at $4 per objective, and 5.80 objectives per week at
$6 per objective. Taken at face value, this implies a price elasticity of demand of 0.87. Put
dierently, students responded to a 10 percent increase in the size of the incentive nearly
linearly by increasing demand for math objectives by 8.7 percent.
Taken together, the evidence on the number of objectives mastered and parent conferences
18attended in treatment versus control schools as well as the response to unexpected price
shocks implies that our incentive scheme had a profound inuence on student and parent
behavior.
5.2 Indirect Outcomes
In this section, we investigate a series of indirect outcomes { standardized test scores, stu-
dent investment, parental involvement, attendance, eort, and intrinsic motivation { that
are correlated with the outcomes for which we provided incentives. Theoretically, due to
misalignment, moral hazard, or psychological factors, the eects of our incentive scheme on
this set of outcomes is ambiguous. For these, and other reasons, Kerr (1975) notoriously
referred to investigating impacts on indirect outcomes as \the folly of rewarding A, while
hoping for B." Still, given the correlation between outcomes such as standardized test scores
and income, health, and likelihood of incarceration, they may be more aligned with the
outcomes of ultimate interest than our direct outcomes (Fryer 2011b).
A. Student and Parent Engagement
The survey results reported in Panel A of Table 5 report measures of student and parent
engagement. Students were asked a variety of survey questions including \Did your parents
check whether you had done your homework more this year or last year?" and \What subject
do you like more, math or reading?" Parents were also asked a variety of questions including
\Do you ask your 5th grade student more often about how he/she is doing in Math class
or Reading class?" Answers to these questions are coded as binary measures and treatment
eects are reported as a percentage change. Details on variable construction from survey
responses are outlined in Online Appendix B. Parent surveys were available in English and
Spanish.
19ITT eects on survey responses indicate that treatment parents were 5.6 percentage
points more likely check their student's homework more during treatment than in the pre-
vious year. However, consistent with a multitasking model, this increased investment was
skewed heavily towards math. Treatment parents were 12.2 (2.8) percentage points more
likely to ask more about math than reading homework, and treated students were 11.2 (2.3)
percentage points more likely to report a preference for math over reading.
B. Student Test Scores
Panel B of Table 5 presents estimates of the eect of incentives on testing outcomes for
which students were not given incentives. These outcomes include Texas' state-mandated
standardized test (TAKS) and a standardized test of general knowledge administered through-
out HISD (Stanford 10). Both assessments are normalized to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one across the city sample. Estimates without and with our parsimo-
nious set of controls are presented in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Standard errors are
in parenthesis below each estimate.
ITT estimates reveal that treatment students outperform control students by 0.081
(.025) in TAKS math, but underperform in TAKS ELA by 0.089 (.027). Stanford 10
results are of a similar magnitude in ELA and statistically zero for math. The positive and
statistically signicant treatment eect on TAKS math scores is promising; however, it is
troubling that the same gains are not reected on students' Stanford 10 scores and that
reading scores declined to a similar degree. Furthermore, compared to the magnitude of the
the eects on direct outcomes { objectives mastered and parent-teacher conferences { the
gains are lilliputian.
In section 6, we argue that a simple moral hazard model with multiple tasks can explain
these results. Another { not mutually exclusive { explanation is that the objectives in AM
are not aligned with those assessed on TAKS. Using Accelerated Math's alignment map,
20we found that of the 152 objectives in the AM Texas 5th grade library, only 105 (69.1
percent) align with any Texas state math standards (TEKS).14 Furthermore, matching the
AM curriculum to Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS) standards in the six sections
of the TAKS math assessment reveals the AM curriculum to be heavily unbalanced; 91 out
of the 105 items are aligned with only 3 sections of the TAKS assessment (1, 4, and 6).
The bottom row of panel B in Table 5 shows the treatment eect of our incentive scheme
on sections of the TAKS math assessment that are most aligned with the AM objectives.
The treatment eect on the aligned sections are modest in size and statistically signicant,
0.137 (.028). The treatment eect on the remaining (non-aligned) portions of the test is
small and statistically insignicant, 0.026 (.030).
C. Effort, Attendance, and Intrinsic Motivation
The rst two rows of Panel C in Table 5 report results for measures of eort. Data on
student eort is not collected by school districts, so we turn to our survey data. We asked
six questions that serve as proxies for eort. They include questions about specic behaviors
(such as turning in homework and being on time for class) as well as attitudes related to
eort (such as feeling that one had \pushed" oneself). See Online Appendix B for further
details.
We aggregated student responses to the six eort proxies into one measure by converting
the responses to an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 where a higher number indicates higher eort,
summing across answers, and normalizing the resulting sum to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one across all students in the experimental sample with valid answers
to all questions. Students with missing answers to any constituent question are coded as
missing, as non-reponse might be confused with low eort otherwise. We also include the
ITT eect on attendance as an outcome as we view this as a form of eort. Attendance is
14Texas state standard alignment are available at http://www.renlearn.com/fundingcenter/
statestandardalignments/texas.aspx
21calculated as a rate of days present divided by days enrolled in any HISD school, which is
then normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across all students
in the experimental sample with valid attendance data.
The treatment eect on our eort index and measure of attendence is small and statisti-
cally insignicant. In particular, students in treatment schools put forth 0.010 (.084) more
eort and had 0.004 (.049) lower attendance rates than students in control schools. Across
our six proxies for eort that make up the index, none of them were signicantly dierent
between treatment and control students (not shown in tabular form).
One of the major criticisms of the use of incentives to boost student achievement is
that the incentives may destroy a student's \love of learning." In other words, providing
extrinsic rewards can crowd out intrinsic motivation in some situations. There is a debate in
social psychology on this issue { see Cameron and Pierce (1994) for a meta-analysis of the
literature.
To test the impact of our incentive experiments on intrinsic motivation, we administered
the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory, developed by Ryan (1982), to students in our experimen-
tal groups.15 The instrument assesses participants' interest/enjoyment, perceived compe-
tence, eort, value/usefulness, pressure and tension, and perceived choice while performing
a given activity. There is a subscale score for each of those six categories. We only include
the interest/enjoyment subscale in our surveys, as it is considered the self-report measure
of intrinsic motivation. To get an overall intrinsic motivation score, we sum the values for
these statements (reversing the sign on statements where stronger responses indicate less in-
trinsic motivation). Only students with valid responses to all statements are included in our
analysis of the overall score, as non-response may be confused with low intrinsic motivation.
15The inventory has been used in several experiments related to intrinsic motivation and self-regulation
[e.g., Ryan, Koestner, and Deci (1991) and Deci et al. (1994)].
22The nal row of Table 5 provides estimates of the impact of our incentive program on
the overall intrinsic motivation score of students in our experimental group. The ITT eect
of incentives on intrinsic motivation is almost exactly zero { 0.005 (.060). This suggests
that the concern of some educators and social psychologists that rewarding students will
negatively impact their \love of learning" is unwarranted in this context, although because
of modest standard errors we cannot rule out a small negative impact.
5.3 Analysis of Subsamples
Table 6 investigates treatment eects on all direct and indirect outcomes for a set of pre-
determined subsamples { gender, race/ethnicity, previous year's test score, and whether a
student is eligible for free or reduced price lunch. All regressions include our parsimonious
set of controls.
Gender is divided into two categories and race/ethnicity is divided into ve categories:
non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian and non-Hispanic
other race. We only include a racial/ethnic category in our analysis if there are at least one
hundred students from that racial/ethnic category in our experimental group; only black and
Hispanic subgroups meet this criteria. Eligibility for free lunch is used as an income proxy.
We also partition students into quintiles according to their baseline TAKS math scores and
report treatment eects for the top and bottom groups.
Panel A of Table 6A presents ITT estimates on direct outcomes in each subgroup, and
panel B details the eects on indirect outcomes. The rst column provides estimates on
the full sample.16 ITT eects across subsamples are generally statistically indistinguishable.
The treatment eect on objectives mastered is statistically larger for girls (1.159) than for
boys (1.012), though boys show larger eects on both TAKS and Stanford 10 tests (only the
16For estimates of the full sample restricted to only students who contain valid information for the
particular subsample, contact the author.
23Stanford 10 eects are statistically distinguishable). Hispanic students made the strongest
gains on math tests. They also mastered more objectives while their parents attended fewer
conferences. Students eligible for free lunch showed large and statistically signicant gains
on both TAKS Math (0.144) and Stanford Math (0.095). They also lost less ground on
both reading tests; however, both the treatment eects and the inter-group dierences are
only marginally signicant.
The most noticeable and robust dierences occur when we stratify on previous year test
scores. On nearly every dimension, high achieving students gain most from the experiment,
both in comparison to high achieving students in control schools or low achieving students in
treatment schools. For instance, high achieving students master 1.7 more objectives, have
parents who attend two more parent-teacher conferences, have 0.23 higher standardized
math test scores and equal reading scores relative to their control counterparts. Notably,
these dierences are statistically distinguishable (in most cases) from the treatment eects
on low achieving students.
6 Discussion and Speculation
Financial incentives can exert a signicant inuence on student and parental behavior. The
eects we observed on outcomes for which we provided incentives are striking { treatment
students mastered more than one  more math objectives than control students and their
parents attended almost twice as many parent-teacher conferences. Providing two unex-
pected price shocks provides further evidence of how strongly students respond to incentives
as we estimate their price elasticity at 0.87.
Yet, despite this behavioral response, the impact of our incentive scheme on related
outcomes for which students were not given incentives is mixed. Treatment parents were
12.2 percentage points more likely to report that they ask about math homework more often
24than reading homework. Similarly, students in treatment schools are 5.6 percentage points
more likely to report that their parents check their homework more this year than last year
and 11.2 percentage points more likely to report a preference for math over reading.
On the other hand, math achievement on the TAKS increased 0.081 (0.025) while
reading achievement decreased by nearly an identical amount. The impact on Stanford 10
scores { a nationally-normed assessment of grade level course material { are statistically zero
for math and negative for reading. There were no statistically signicant eects on measures
of eort or intrinsic motivation.
We argue that these facts are consistent with the classic model of moral hazard with
multiple tasks exposited in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).17 To illustrate, imagine an
environment with moral hazard and three tasks { classroom math, computer math, and
classroom reading. In the absence of additional incentives, there exists an equilibrium allo-
cation of eort across tasks in which the marginal product of each task equals its marginal
cost. Our experiment introduces incentives for computer math only, which alters the optimal
eort allocation across tasks, causing students to shift their focus from classroom math and
reading to computer math. The large treatment eects on objectives mastered in AM can
be attributed to this shift. If classroom math is more correlated with math standardized
test scores than computerized math, then it is not surprising that a one  increase in objec-
tives mastered only yields a 0.08 increase in test scores. Furthermore, to the extent that
mastering math objectives crowds out classroom reading, one would expect reading scores to
decline. Finally, assuming high achievers have lower cost of eort than low achievers and the
education production function is such that high achievers make more ecient use of com-
17Moreover, the moral hazard model with multiple tasks may help explain data from other experiments.
Fryer (2011) demonstrates that paying students to read books has a positive and statistically signicant
eect on reading comprehension for English speakers without a corresponding decrease in math scores. This
may be due, in part, to the fact that the incentivized activity was performed outside of school. Because
students read books at home and took computerized quizzes before or after school or during their lunch
period, the program likely increased total eort rather than simply reallocating eort across tasks.
25puterized math and than classroom math (e.g. due to complementarities in production or
because instruction is targeted at the median student) one can explain why higher achievers
beneted disproportionately in math without experiencing negative eects in reading.
The key challenge going forward in using incentives in education is how to turn the pro-
found power of incentives as modiers of student and parent behavior into tangible academic
gains. This may require incentives models that explicitly incentivize a balanced investment
in a range of complementary inputs or that more tightly regulate how teachers utilize the
incentives within their classrooms. The complexity of the education production function,
its inherent complementarities, and limits on inputs of cognition and eort place important
constraints that must factor into the design of future experiments.
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Notes:  The vertical axis represents the average number of Accelerated Math (AM) objectives mastered by the 
average student per week. The horizontal axis represents each pay period. Prices in braces above individual points 
indicate changes in the price paid to treatment students per objective mastered in AM. If no price is indicated in 
braces above a point, treatment students were paid $2 per objective during that pay period. Control students 
were never paid at any price level. 















































Pay PeriodTable 1: Summary of Math Stars Houston Incentives Experiment
A. Overview
Schools
50 HISD schools opted in to participate, 25 schools randomly chosen for treatment. All treatment and control schools
were provided complete Accelerated Mathematics software, training, and implementation materials (handouts and
practice exercises).
Treatment Group 1,693 5th grade students: 27.5% black, 70.1% Hispanic, 55.5% free lunch eligible
Control Group 1,735 5th grade students: 25.7% black, 68.2% Hispanic, 53.6% free lunch eligible
Outcomes of Interest
TAKS State Assessment, Stanford 10 Assessment, Accelerated Math Objective Mastery, Parent Conference
Attendance, Measures of Parent Involvement, Measures of Student Motivation and Eort
Test Dates TAKS: April 12-23, 2011; TAKS Retake: May 23-25, 2011; Stanford 10: May 8-10, 2011
Objectives Database
During periods 1{4, students could earn rewards for mastering any objective in the Accelerated Math curriculum.
During periods 5{9, students were only rewarded for mastering objectives at or above the 4th grade level.
Operations $875,000 distributed in incentives payments, 99% consent rate. 2 dedicated project managers.
B. Phases of Treatment Regular Incentives Bonus Round Lightning Round
Basic Reward Structure
Students paid $2 per objective to
practice a math objective and pass a
short test to ensure they mastered it.
The average student earned $4.95 per
week during each regular pay period.
Students paid $4 per objective to
practice a math objective and pass a
short test to ensure they mastered it.
The average student earned $14.96
per week during the bonus round pay
period.
Students paid $6 per objective to
practice a math objective and pass a
short test to ensure they mastered it.
The average student earned $36.84
per week during the lightning round
pay period.
Additional Incentives
$100 for mastering 200th objective
(cumulatively)
$100 for mastering 200th objective
(cumulatively)




Period 1: 09/20-10/08 Period 2:
10/11-11/01 Period 3: 11/02-12/3
Period 4: 12/6-1/14 Period 5:
1/18-2/11 Period 7: 3/21-4/15 Period
8a: 4/18-4/30 Period 9: 5/9-5/25
Period 6: 2/14-3/11 Period 8b: 5/2-5/6
Frequency of Rewards
Paydays were held every 3-4 weeks,
with schoolwide celebrations to
encourage participation in October,
December, and March.
Payday on 3/23 Payday on 5/19
Notes. In panel A, each row describes an aspect of treatment indicated in the rst column. In panel B, each column represents a dierent phase of treatment. Entries are
descriptions of the schools, students, outcomes of interest, testing dates, and basic operations of each phase of the incentive treatment. See Appendix A for more details. The
numbers of treatment and control students given are for those students who have non-missing reading or math test scores.Table 2: Pre-Treatment Characteristics of Non-Experimental and Experimental Schools
Non-Exp. Exp. E vs. NE T vs. C
5th Grade 5th Grade p-value Treatment Control p-value
Teacher Characteristics
Percent male 0.161 0.183 0.105 0.174 0.191 0.317
(0.079) (0.078) (0.074) (0.082)
Percent black 0.322 0.370 0.307 0.366 0.374 0.777
(0.255) (0.292) (0.330) (0.257)
Percent Hispanic 0.343 0.365 0.547 0.352 0.377 0.417
(0.213) (0.202) (0.222) (0.183)
Percent white 0.290 0.222 0.033 0.236 0.207 0.668
(0.233) (0.158) (0.141) (0.176)
Percent Asian 0.034 0.032 0.798 0.029 0.035 0.315
(0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.035)
Percent other race 0.010 0.011 0.838 0.015 0.007 0.224
(0.015) (0.022) (0.026) (0.016)
Mean teacher salary / 1000 51.942 52.079 0.674 52.088 52.071 0.523
(2.058) (1.848) (1.706) (2.014)
Mean years teaching experience 11.878 12.082 0.657 12.222 11.942 0.326
(2.781) (2.656) (2.476) (2.870)
Mean Teacher Value Added: Math 0.040 -0.162 0.031 -0.211 -0.113 0.456
(0.468) (0.586) (0.417) (0.722)
Mean Teacher Value Added: Reading 0.040 -0.121 0.080 -0.128 -0.113 0.779
(0.465) (0.566) (0.411) (0.696)
Student Body Characteristics
# of suspensions per student 0.096 0.106 0.606 0.087 0.126 0.883
(0.096) (0.108) (0.192)
# of days suspended per student 0.214 0.261 0.365 0.225 0.297 0.925
(0.988) (0.290) (0.395)
Total Enrollment 2009-2010 727.467 593.068 0.000 606.522 579.251 0.718
(202.807) (163.744) (117.878)
Number of Schools 130 50 25 25
Notes: This table reports school-level summary statistics for our aligned incentives experiment. The non-experimental
sample includes all HISD schools with at least one 5th grade class in 2009-10. Column (3) reports p-values on the null
hypthesis of equal means in the experimental and non-experimental sample. Column (6) reports the same p-value for
treatment and control schools. Each test uses heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, and the latter test controls for
matched-pair ﬁxed effects.Table 3: Student Pre-Treatment Characteristics
HISD T vs. C.
5th Grade Treatment Control p-value
Student Characteristics
Male 0.510 0.526 0.525 0:504
(0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
White 0.078 0.019 0.046 0:000
(0.268) (0.138) (0.211)
Black 0.248 0.275 0.257 0:015
(0.432) (0.447) (0.437)
Hispanic 0.632 0.701 0.682 0:876
(0.482) (0.458) (0.466)
Asian 0.030 0.001 0.009 0:002
(0.172) (0.035) (0.094)
Other Race 0.012 0.003 0.006 0:364
(0.109) (0.055) (0.077)
Special Education Services 0.098 0.108 0.086 0:668
(0.297) (0.311) (0.281)
Limited English Proﬁcient 0.307 0.293 0.336 0:017
(0.461) (0.455) (0.473)
Gifted and Talented 0.193 0.138 0.166 0:040
(0.394) (0.345) (0.373)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.828 0.929 0.909 0:219
(0.377) (0.257) (0.287)
Free or Reduced Price Lunch 0.513 0.555 0.536 0:349
(0.500) (0.497) (0.499)
TAKS Math 09-10 0.000 -0.142 -0.082 0:043
(1.000) (0.944) (0.954)
TAKS ELA 09-10 0.000 -0.166 -0.152 0:629
(1.000) (0.934) (0.956)
Missing Previous Math Scores 0.129 0.117 0.114 0:448
(0.336) (0.321) (0.317)
Missing Previous ELA Scores 0.134 0.125 0.122 0:514
(0.340) (0.331) (0.327)
p-value from joint F-test 0:295
Student Outcomes
Participated in Program 0.111 0.966 0.001 0:000
(0.314) (0.180) (0.034)
Periods Treated 0.944 8.473 0.003 0:000
(2.717) (1.739) (0.107)
Observations 15389 1693 1735 3428
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for our aligned incentives experiment. The sample is restricted to 5th
grade students with valid test score data for the 2010 - 2011 school year. Column (4) reports p-values on the null
hypothesis of equal means in treatment and control groups using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and controls
for matched-pair ﬁxed effects.Table 4 - Mean Effect Sizes (Intent-to-
Treat Estimates): Direct Outcomes
Raw Controlled
Objectives Mastered 0.978*** 1.087***
(0.029) (0.031)
3292 3292




and attending parent teacher conferences. The number of objectives mastered is standardized to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one in the experimental sample. Raw regressions include controls for previous TAKS test
scores, their squares, and matched pair ﬁxed effects. Controlled regressions also include controls for gender, race, free
lunch eligibility, special education status, and whether the student spoke English as second language. *** = signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.Table 5 - Mean Effect Sizes (Intent to Treat Estimates): Indirect Outcomes
Raw Controlled
A. Survey Outcomes
Parents check HW more 0.047** 0.056**
(0.021) (0.023)
2315 2315
Student prefers Math to Reading 0.118*** 0.112***
(0.021) (0.023)
2356 2356




TAKS Math 0.077*** 0.081***
(0.024) (0.025)
3128 3128
TAKS ELA -0.101*** -0.089***
(0.026) (0.027)
3108 3108
Stanford 10 Math 0.014 0.031
(0.023) (0.024)
3323 3323
Stanford 10 ELA -0.132*** -0.110***
(0.023) (0.023)
3324 3324
Aligned TAKS Math 0.129*** 0.137***
(0.027) (0.028)
3090 3090
Unaligned TAKS Math 0.023 0.026
(0.029) (0.030)
3090 3090
C. Effort and Motivation
Attendance 2010-2011 -0.028 -0.004
(0.032) (0.033)
3322 3322
Effort Index Score -0.075 0.010
(0.053) (0.057)
2119 2119
Motivation Index Score 0.040 0.005
(0.056) (0.060)
2004 2004
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates of the effects of our aligned incentives experiment on various test scores and
survey responses. Testing and attendance variables are drawn from HISD attendance ﬁles and standardized to have
a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 among 5th graders with valid test scores. The survey responses included
here are coded as zero-one variables; The effort and intrinsic motivation indices are constructed from separate survey
responses; their construction is outlined in detail in the text of this paper and Online Appendix B. Raw regressions
include controls for previous test scores, their squares, and matched-pair ﬁxed effects. Controlled regressions also
include controls for the gender, race, free lunch eligibility, special education status, and whether the student spoke
English as second language. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** =
signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.Table 6A: Mean Effect Sizes (Intent to Treat) on Direct Outcomes and Test Scores By Subsample
Whole Gender Race Free Lunch Math Quintile
Sample Male Female p-val Black Hispanic p-val Yes No p-val Bottom Top p-val
A. Direct Outcomes
Objectives Mastered 1.087*** 1.012*** 1.159*** 0.816*** 1.114*** 1.096*** 1.055*** 0.686*** 1.660***
(0.031) (0.045) (0.043) 0.017 (0.045) (0.045) 0.000 (0.043) (0.047) 0.519 (0.047) (0.117) 0.000
3292 1728 1554 857 2283 1774 1492 694 423
Conferences Attended 1.578*** 1.716*** 1.423*** 1.698*** 1.474*** 1.633*** 1.594*** 1.489*** 1.894***
(0.099) (0.147) (0.136) 0.135 (0.250) (0.131) 0.408 (0.132) (0.155) 0.844 (0.235) (0.307) 0.254
2052 1018 1030 526 1424 1127 911 394 270
B. Test Outcomes
TAKS Math 0.081*** 0.106*** 0.040 -0.002 0.104*** 0.144*** -0.006 -0.004 0.228***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.037) 0.183 (0.056) (0.033) 0.101 (0.034) (0.037) 0.003 (0.049) (0.082) 0.011
3128 1636 1491 828 2165 1687 1421 663 428
TAKS ELA -0.089*** -0.072* -0.103** -0.077 -0.094*** -0.043 -0.132*** -0.163** 0.004
(0.027) (0.038) (0.040) 0.572 (0.074) (0.034) 0.833 (0.038) (0.042) 0.113 (0.063) (0.084) 0.097
3108 1616 1491 821 2151 1677 1411 659 427
Stanford 10 Math 0.031 0.072** -0.008 -0.127** 0.038 0.095*** -0.053 -0.059 0.138***
(0.024) (0.035) (0.032) 0.086 (0.056) (0.030) 0.008 (0.033) (0.035) 0.002 (0.056) (0.050) 0.006
3323 1749 1572 880 2300 1796 1506 704 428
Stanford 10 ELA -0.110*** -0.092*** -0.141*** -0.161*** -0.099*** -0.067** -0.144*** -0.198*** -0.053
(0.023) (0.035) (0.031) 0.288 (0.057) (0.031) 0.328 (0.033) (0.034) 0.097 (0.056) (0.056) 0.056
3324 1751 1571 882 2299 1796 1507 706 428
Notes: This table reports ITT estimates of the effects of the experiment on direct outcomes and test scores for a variety of subsamples. All regressions follow the
controlled speciﬁcation described in the notes of previous tables. All test outcomes are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one among all HISD
ﬁfth graders. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, and * = signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.Table 6B: Mean Effect Sizes (Intent to Treat) on Survey Responses and Effort/Motivation Outcomes By Subsample
Whole Gender Race Free Lunch Math Quintile
Sample Male Female p-val Black Hispanic p-val Yes No p-val Bottom Top p-val
A. Survey Outcomes
Check HW 0.056** 0.030 0.083*** 0.031 0.027 0.025 0.079** 0.151** 0.126**
(0.023) (0.034) (0.031) 0.247 (0.067) (0.031) 0.958 (0.033) (0.033) 0.237 (0.060) (0.062) 0.754
2315 1196 1113 566 1626 1232 1066 493 293
Prefer Math 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.130*** 0.065 0.119*** 0.154*** 0.056* 0.153** 0.082
(0.023) (0.032) (0.033) 0.565 (0.069) (0.029) 0.465 (0.033) (0.033) 0.032 (0.062) (0.063) 0.396
2356 1214 1136 575 1656 1252 1087 506 299
Ask about Math 0.122*** 0.088** 0.137*** 0.173** 0.118*** 0.104*** 0.136*** 0.032 0.214***
(0.028) (0.041) (0.038) 0.366 (0.073) (0.036) 0.488 (0.037) (0.042) 0.561 (0.068) (0.077) 0.057
1908 945 960 480 1334 1052 843 356 259
B. Effort and Motivation Outcomes
Attendance -0.004 0.004 -0.010 0.022 -0.033 -0.018 -0.009 -0.051 -0.002
(0.033) (0.047) (0.047) 0.832 (0.085) (0.038) 0.549 (0.044) (0.051) 0.892 (0.075) (0.083) 0.653
3322 1739 1582 880 2299 1796 1505 700 428
Motivation Index 0.005 -0.062 0.047 -0.115 0.015 -0.067 0.083 0.139 0.217
(0.060) (0.090) (0.084) 0.360 (0.150) (0.082) 0.425 (0.088) (0.088) 0.216 (0.156) (0.206) 0.742
2004 1029 969 476 1426 1072 916 400 260
Effort Index 0.010 -0.013 0.030 -0.023 -0.031 0.058 -0.022 -0.144 -0.283
(0.057) (0.087) (0.078) 0.701 (0.192) (0.075) 0.966 (0.077) (0.085) 0.474 (0.174) (0.199) 0.569
2119 1098 1016 506 1501 1136 968 434 281
On Time For Class 0.036 0.040 0.017 -0.045 0.026 -0.040 0.114 -0.040 -0.318**
(0.055) (0.082) (0.077) 0.833 (0.156) (0.076) 0.671 (0.077) (0.083) 0.169 (0.150) (0.144) 0.159
2280 1180 1094 560 1600 1217 1046 483 296
Turns in HW 0.024 0.040 0.009 0.085 -0.014 0.070 -0.018 -0.141 -0.199
(0.055) (0.081) (0.077) 0.781 (0.128) (0.074) 0.494 (0.076) (0.081) 0.420 (0.150) (0.150) 0.771
2276 1175 1095 556 1601 1217 1042 487 296
Asks Questions 0.058 -0.064 0.154** -0.022 -0.035 0.062 0.065 -0.034 -0.238
(0.057) (0.087) (0.077) 0.058 (0.197) (0.076) 0.950 (0.080) (0.085) 0.978 (0.152) (0.179) 0.358
2246 1162 1079 543 1583 1195 1035 468 296
Happy w/ Achvmnt. -0.007 0.010 -0.029 0.073 -0.013 0.086 -0.094 0.027 -0.267
(0.056) (0.081) (0.080) 0.725 (0.150) (0.075) 0.600 (0.077) (0.084) 0.109 (0.150) (0.180) 0.184
2254 1164 1084 547 1587 1195 1042 473 291
Pushed Myself 0.050 0.080 0.030 0.147 0.050 -0.009 0.093 -0.032 0.120
(0.056) (0.081) (0.079) 0.649 (0.162) (0.074) 0.577 (0.075) (0.085) 0.358 (0.142) (0.167) 0.464
2268 1173 1089 553 1594 1205 1047 480 295
Could do Better 0.091* 0.039 0.149** -0.121 0.116* 0.017 0.148* 0.093 0.046
(0.055) (0.080) (0.076) 0.310 (0.175) (0.069) 0.195 (0.075) (0.084) 0.237 (0.149) (0.174) 0.831
2278 1177 1095 557 1601 1211 1050 480 296Notes: This table reports ITT estimates of the effects of the experiment on survey responses and effort/motivation outcomes for a variety of subsamples. All
regressions follow the controlled speciﬁcation described in the notes of previous tables. All survey outcomes in Panel A are coded as binary variables. In Panel B,
attendance and the two indices are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Responses to the six survey questions that make up the effort
index are recorded on a one to ﬁve scale; we standardize them to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within the experimental sample. Construction
of our indices is described in detail in the text and in Online Appendix B. *** = signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** = signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, and * = signiﬁcant
at 10 percent level.